

SOCIAL ALIENATION AND THE CRISIS OF MEANING IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTERPRETATION OF HEIDEGGER AND BENHABIB

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the relationship between social alienation and the crisis of meaning in contemporary political philosophy through a comparative analysis of the philosophical approaches of Martin Heidegger and Seyla Benhabib. The study is based on the premise that alienation should not be understood exclusively as an individual condition of isolation or as a weakening of interpersonal relations. Rather, it has existential, social, and political dimensions that may intersect in experiences of loss of belonging, recognition, and the capacity for political participation. The aim of the study is to identify the theoretical relationship between existential alienation, the crisis of meaningful orientation, social recognition, and political membership. Methodologically, the article employs a comparative-conceptual analysis. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, being-in-the-world, everydayness, and authenticity is used to reconstruct the existential dimension of alienation, while Benhabib's political philosophy provides a framework for examining recognition, the rights of others, political membership, and the democratic reconsideration of the boundaries of belonging. The analysis demonstrates that the crisis of meaning is not identical with political exclusion; however, when combined with a lack of social recognition, it may intensify experiences of social invisibility and distance from the political community. The article argues that overcoming alienation requires not only the restoration of meaningful orientation but also the creation of conditions for recognition and political agency.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of social alienation occupies an important place in contemporary social and political philosophy, as it concerns the relationship of the individual to oneself, to other people, and to the common world. Under conditions of changing traditional forms of social belonging and the transformation of social ties, a person may maintain a factual presence within society while simultaneously experiencing a loss of a stable connection with the surrounding world, its meanings, and its institutions. Therefore, alienation should not be reduced exclusively to physical isolation or a lack of social contacts. Contemporary philosophical approaches to alienation likewise emphasize the importance of a meaningful relationship to oneself and others rather than reducing alienation to simple physical separation (Jaeggi, 2014).

For a deeper analysis of this problem, it is necessary to distinguish between the existential and socio-political dimensions of alienation. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger makes it possible to examine the first level. In *Being and Time*, human existence is defined through the concept of Dasein and the structure of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein). The human being is not an isolated subject that first exists independently and then enters into relationships with surrounding reality. Rather, human existence is initially realized within a particular world of meanings, possibilities, and relationships (Heidegger, 1962; Taylor, 1989).

This understanding has direct significance for the problem of alienation. If a person initially exists within the world, then the disruption of their connection with this world cannot be fully explained by the absence of social contacts. Alienation may manifest itself as a transformation in a person's relationship to their own existence and to the meanings through which they understand themselves and the surrounding reality (Heidegger, 1962; Jaeggi, 2014).

The concepts of thrownness, everydayness, and das Man are of particular importance in this regard. Human beings always already find themselves in a particular historical and social situation.

Their ways of behaving and understanding the world are largely formed prior to individual choice. At the same time, the problem of orientation is connected with the broader question of how individuals understand themselves and what they regard as meaningful within their moral and social world (Heidegger, 1962; Taylor, 1989).

However, Heidegger's philosophy is not a theory of social alienation in the narrow sociological sense. Therefore, in the present study, it is used to reconstruct the existential foundation of alienation rather than to directly identify Heideggerian ontology with theories of social exclusion. This approach makes it possible to preserve the distinction between the ontological analysis of Dasein and the political-normative analysis of belonging.

To move toward the political dimension of the problem, another theoretical perspective is required. Here, the philosophy of Seyla Benhabib is of particular importance, as she examines the relationship between universal human rights and the boundaries of particular political communities. In *The Rights of Others*, political membership is considered one of the central problems of contemporary political philosophy (Benhabib, 2004).

The problem of political membership becomes particularly evident in the situation of migrants, refugees, and other persons whose belonging to a political community is limited or uncertain. A person may physically reside within a society, participate in its economic and social life, and simultaneously lack full access to political mechanisms of participation (Benhabib, 2004). This distinction between social presence and political membership can also be situated within the broader sociological development of citizenship, in which legal, political, and social dimensions of membership are not necessarily identical (Marshall, 1950).

Thus, a distinction emerges between social presence and political belonging. The formal presence of an individual within society does not in itself guarantee recognition as a full participant in public life. It is precisely this gap that makes it possible to connect the problem of social alienation with the question of political agency.

Of particular importance here is Benhabib's concept of democratic iterations. Universal principles of rights do not exist exclusively as immutable abstract norms. They acquire concrete meaning through their interpretation, public discussion, and democratic practice (Benhabib, 2006, 2007). Consequently, the boundaries of the political community may also become subject to normative reconsideration.

The present article proposes understanding social alienation as a multi-level phenomenon. At the existential level, it is connected with an individual's relationship to their own existence and meaning; at the social level, with relations of recognition and belonging; and at the political level, with the possibility of participating in the formation of common norms and acting as a political subject.

The aim of the study is to identify the interrelationship between the crisis of meaning, social alienation, recognition, and political exclusion through a comparison of the philosophical approaches of Heidegger and Benhabib.

To achieve this aim, the following tasks are addressed:

1. to reveal the existential dimension of alienation in Heidegger's philosophy;
2. to analyze the problem of recognition and political membership in Benhabib;
3. to examine the relationship between the crisis of meaning, social invisibility, and the loss of belonging;
4. to determine the significance of political recognition for the formation of subjectivity;
5. to demonstrate possible points of intersection between the existential and political dimensions of alienation.

The methodological basis of the study is a comparative-conceptual analysis. The comparison of Heidegger and Benhabib makes it possible to identify the differences between existential and political-normative levels of analysis without reducing one to the other.

The central thesis of the article is that social alienation acquires a political dimension when a crisis of meaningful orientation intersects with a lack of social recognition and limitations on opportunities for political belonging. Such a relationship does not constitute a linear causal

dependency, but rather represents an analytically significant space of interaction between existential experience and political relations.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The methodological basis of the study is a comparative-conceptual analysis. The comparison of Heidegger and Benhabib makes it possible to identify the differences between existential and political-normative levels of analysis without reducing one to the other.

The analysis of Heidegger is used to reconstruct the existential dimension of alienation through the concepts of *Dasein*, being-in-the-world, thrownness, everydayness, *das Man*, and authenticity (Heidegger, 1962). The analysis of Benhabib is used to examine the normative conditions of political belonging, recognition, political membership, political participation, and democratic reconsideration of the boundaries of belonging (Benhabib, 2004, 2006, 2007).

The study also considers Honneth's theory of recognition and Patterson's concept of social death as complementary conceptual perspectives. Honneth's theory is used in relation to recognition and the individual's relationship with the social world, while Patterson's concept is used cautiously as an analytical category for examining the extreme weakening of social ties and belonging (Honneth, 1995; Patterson, 1982).

The study further draws on complementary approaches to recognition, participation, citizenship, and political membership. Fraser's account of recognition is relevant to the problem of institutionalized misrecognition and parity of participation, while Young's analysis highlights the political significance of exclusion, domination, difference, and participation (Fraser, 2000; Young, 1990). Marshall's classical account of citizenship provides a framework for distinguishing different dimensions of membership in social and political life (Marshall, 1950). Arendt's analysis of statelessness and the right to have rights provides an additional perspective for understanding the relationship between political membership and the effective exercise of rights (Arendt, 1951).

The comparison is therefore conducted across interconnected existential, social, and political dimensions. The purpose of the method is not to establish a direct causal relationship between existential alienation and political exclusion, but to identify analytically significant points of intersection between these dimensions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Existential foundations of alienation

In Heidegger's philosophy, human existence cannot be understood independently of the world. *Dasein* is characterized as being-in-the-world, that is, as an existence that is always already embedded within a particular horizon of meanings and possibilities (Heidegger, 1962). Therefore, a person does not first form an autonomous identity and then enter into relations with the world; rather, their relationship to themselves is formed within the world itself.

The concept of thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) demonstrates that a person does not choose the initial conditions of their own existence. They find themselves in a particular historical epoch, language, culture, and social situation (Heidegger, 1962). However, thrownness does not imply complete determinism. *Dasein* retains the possibility of adopting a particular relationship to its own conditions and possibilities.

The concept of *das Man* occupies an important place in the analysis of everydayness. In everyday life, a person often orients themselves toward what is considered generally accepted, normal, or permissible. These norms create a necessary structure of social orientation, but at the same time they may limit the individual's capacity to critically reflect upon their own existence (Heidegger, 1962).

It is precisely here that the existential dimension of alienation emerges. It does not simply mean the absence of social connections. A person may be surrounded by others and actively participate in everyday life while nevertheless experiencing a distance from their own possibilities. Alienation in this sense is connected with a weakening of one's own relationship to existence (Jaeggi, 2014).

Authenticity in Heidegger does not mean complete withdrawal from society or the achievement of absolute autonomy. It denotes the possibility of Dasein establishing its own relationship to its possibilities and assuming responsibility for its mode of existence (Heidegger, 1962). Therefore, the problem of authenticity is not connected with rejecting the social world, but with the possibility of not becoming completely absorbed in anonymous ways of interpreting it.

It follows that the crisis of meaning cannot be reduced to the absence of a specific life goal. A deeper crisis emerges when the habitual system of meanings ceases to provide a person with stable orientation. The individual begins to experience distance not only from particular goals but also from the very horizon within which those goals acquire meaning. The relationship between identity and orientation in a moral space provides a complementary perspective for understanding this problem (Taylor, 1989).

The expression “the silence of God,” used in the present study, has precisely this interpretative meaning. It denotes a crisis of traditional absolute foundations of meaning rather than a literal assertion concerning Heidegger's theological position.

Under conditions of such a crisis, the individual faces the necessity of relating their existence independently to a world that no longer provides a single and indisputable foundation.

Thus, existential alienation can be defined as a weakening of the individual's immediate relationship to their own existence, the world of meanings, and their own possibilities. This definition provides a basis for further analysis of the ways in which such an experience may acquire social forms.

Recognition and political membership in Seyla Benhabib

While Heidegger makes it possible to examine the individual's relationship to the world and to their own existence, Benhabib shifts attention toward the normative conditions of shared political life. The central question becomes who is recognized as a participant in the political community and how the boundaries of belonging are established (Benhabib, 2004).

In *The Rights of Others*, Benhabib examines the tension between the universality of human rights and the right of a political community to determine its own boundaries of membership (Benhabib, 2004). This contradiction becomes particularly evident in relation to those who move between political communities or find themselves outside full civic status.

Political membership therefore cannot be understood merely as a legal category. It is connected with the possibility of participating in the public sphere, making claims, and being recognized as a subject of political action. A person may possess certain rights while simultaneously remaining limited in their ability to participate in the formation of common norms (Benhabib, 2004).

The concept of citizenship likewise contains legal, political, and social dimensions. This makes it possible to distinguish formal status from broader forms of participation and belonging within social life (Marshall, 1950).

The concept of democratic iterations allows Benhabib to demonstrate that universal principles of rights acquire concrete meaning through processes of democratic interpretation (Benhabib, 2006, 2007). Political communities are not completely closed systems: their norms and boundaries may become subjects of public contestation.

This is particularly important for the problem of alienation. If excluded or partially included groups are able to participate in reconsidering the conditions of their own belonging, political participation becomes not only a result of recognition but also a means of producing it (Benhabib, 2007).

Thus, political agency should not be regarded solely as a consequence of a previously granted civic status. It may be formed through public action and demands for recognition. It is precisely here that social presence may be transformed into political visibility.

Young's analysis of domination, exclusion, and participation similarly emphasizes the importance of inclusive political frameworks for groups whose experiences have been marginalized within dominant institutions (Young, 1990).

Crisis of meaning and social alienation

The crisis of meaning acquires social significance when a person loses a connection not only with individual goals but also with the common world of meanings. Since human existence always takes place within a particular world, a disruption of the connection with this world may have consequences for an individual's relationship with others and with themselves (Heidegger, 1962; Jaeggi, 2014).

However, the crisis of meaning and social alienation are not identical conditions. The former primarily concerns the meaningful orientation of existence, while the latter concerns the character of social relations. Their relationship is mediated.

The social world provides a person with language, norms, and forms of interaction through which they understand their own position. Therefore, a sustained rupture between an individual and the surrounding social structures may intensify a crisis of meaningful orientation. Conversely, a prolonged sense of meaninglessness may complicate participation in social relations. Taylor's analysis of identity and moral orientation provides a complementary account of the importance of frameworks of meaning for self-understanding (Taylor, 1989).

Here the problem of social invisibility emerges. It should be understood as a situation in which a person is factually present within society but does not receive sufficient recognition as a subject possessing their own voice and the right to participate in shared life.

Social invisibility differs from physical absence. A person may be economically active, interact with state institutions, and maintain social contacts, while their interests may nevertheless remain insufficiently represented in the public sphere.

Honneth's theory of recognition makes it possible to complement this perspective. In *The Struggle for Recognition*, recognition is regarded as a central element of social conflicts and relations between the subject and society (Honneth, 1995). Honneth's later discussion of invisibility further develops the epistemological dimension of recognition and the relation between being perceived and being socially recognized (Honneth, 2001).

Fraser's account of recognition provides a further distinction by emphasizing that misrecognition may be institutionalized in patterns of social interaction and can therefore affect the possibility of participating as a peer in social life (Fraser, 2000).

For the purposes of the present study, this means that social belonging depends not only on factual presence but also on the character of the relationships within which a person is recognized by others.

A lack of recognition may intensify the distance between the individual and the social world. If a person is systematically perceived as a less significant participant in social life, their social presence may persist while their sense of belonging weakens (Honneth, 1995, 2001).

This process is particularly evident in relation to groups situated at the boundaries of political membership. Migrants and refugees may be included in economic and everyday relations while remaining politically constrained (Benhabib, 2004, 2007). A gap thus emerges between factual presence and the ability to participate in determining common norms.

Therefore, social alienation may be regarded as an intermediate space between an individual crisis of meaning and institutional political exclusion. It emerges where a weakening of the connection with the world coincides with a lack of recognition and belonging.

Social death and the loss of belonging

The concept of social death is originally associated with the analysis of the radical loss of social ties and belonging. In Orlando Patterson's study, social death describes a condition in which an individual becomes incorporated into the social order under conditions of profound subordination and loss of full belonging (Patterson, 1982). In the present article, this concept is used more cautiously—as an analytical category denoting an extreme weakening of social ties and recognition.

Social death does not mean the physical termination of existence. A person continues to live, interact, and perform certain functions, but their relationship with the social world may become so weakened that they cease to be perceived as a full participant in shared life (Patterson, 1982).

It is important to emphasize that the concept of social death cannot be mechanically transferred from the analysis of slavery to contemporary migration or political situations. Historical forms of socio-legal exclusion differ. Nevertheless, the very idea of a distinction between physical presence and full social belonging allows for a useful analytical analogy.

In this sense, social invisibility represents a less radical but structurally related form of weakened belonging. A person remains visible in administrative or economic terms, while their political voice may remain restricted. The relationship between invisibility and recognition is also significant in Honneth's account of recognition (Honneth, 2001).

The Arendtian problem of the "right to have rights" acquires particular significance here. In the analysis of the situation of people deprived of stable political belonging, it becomes evident that the formal proclamation of universal rights does not always ensure the possibility of their practical exercise. For this, a political world is necessary in which a person is recognized as a participant in a shared space (Arendt, 1951; Benhabib, 2004).

For precisely this reason, political membership has not only a legal but also an existential significance. To belong to a political community means to have the possibility of perceiving the surrounding world as a space in which one's own presence is recognized as meaningful.

Migration may intensify this problem because a person finds themselves between different systems of belonging. They may lose some of their previous social ties without gaining full inclusion in a new political community. As a result, an intermediate condition emerges in which social presence does not coincide with political belonging.

The relationship between citizenship and social membership further demonstrates why formal political status should not be treated as identical with all dimensions of social belonging (Marshall, 1950).

However, this process is not irreversible. Democratic iterations create the possibility of reconsidering existing norms and boundaries of belonging (Benhabib, 2006, 2007). Political action enables a group situated at the periphery of the community to assert its own presence and demand changes in the conditions of recognition.

Thus, social death, social invisibility, and political exclusion represent different levels of the loss of belonging. They cannot be completely reduced to one another, but they may mutually reinforce each other.

Political exclusion and political agency

Political exclusion is associated not only with the absence of citizenship. The deeper problem lies in limiting an individual's ability to participate in shaping the norms that regulate their own life. Political agency presupposes the possibility of acting in the public sphere, making claims, and participating in the collective determination of common rules.

Benhabib demonstrates that political membership exists in tension between the universal claims of human rights and the specific boundaries of political communities (Benhabib, 2004). Therefore, a person may possess certain rights while simultaneously remaining limited in political participation.

The distinction between formal inclusion and actual participation is of fundamental importance here. Formal inclusion means possessing a particular legal status. Actual participation presupposes the ability to use the public sphere to express interests and influence the formation of norms.

The concept of democratic iterations demonstrates that political norms may be reconsidered as a result of their public interpretation and contestation (Benhabib, 2006, 2007). Therefore, political agency may be formed precisely through the process of demanding recognition.

A group demanding recognition does not merely ask to be granted an already existing place within the political order. It may simultaneously call into question the criteria through which that order determines belonging. In such a case, political action becomes a means of transforming the political community itself.

This is particularly important for migrants and other groups with limited political status. Their situation demonstrates that social integration does not guarantee political agency. A person may be

integrated into economic life, maintain social ties, and simultaneously have limited opportunities to participate in political decision-making.

Therefore, overcoming alienation requires not only social contacts but also recognition of a person's capacity to act. Political agency presupposes a transition from the position of an object of political governance to that of a participant in the political process.

In this respect, Honneth's theory of recognition complements Benhabib. If recognition creates the social conditions for the formation of a positive relationship between the individual and themselves, political participation provides the opportunity to embody this recognition in public action (Honneth, 1995).

Fraser's conception of recognition is also relevant because it connects misrecognition with institutional patterns that prevent individuals or groups from participating as peers in social life (Fraser, 2000).

Young's analysis similarly emphasizes that political participation must be considered in relation to structures of domination and exclusion, rather than being reduced to formal equality alone (Young, 1990).

Political agency, therefore, is a dynamic category. It does not necessarily begin only after the acquisition of full status. It may be formed through collective action, public demands, and participation in the democratic reconsideration of existing norms (Benhabib, 2007).

Existential alienation and political agency

The comparison of Heidegger and Benhabib makes it possible to bring together two different theoretical levels. Heidegger examines the individual's relationship to their own being and to the world, whereas Benhabib analyzes the conditions of political belonging and participation. A direct causal relationship cannot be established between these levels; nevertheless, they may be considered complementary perspectives.

Existential alienation is associated with a weakening of the individual's relationship to their own possibilities and the world of meanings (Heidegger, 1962; Jaeggi, 2014). Social alienation concerns their relationships with others and with social institutions. Political alienation emerges when a person is limited in their ability to participate in shaping the common political world.

These levels can be presented as an analytical sequence:

crisis of meaning → weakening of the connection with the world → lack of recognition → social invisibility → limitation of political participation.

This sequence is not a universal causal law. A person may experience an existential crisis independently of their political status, while political exclusion may exist without an expressed crisis of meaning. Nevertheless, the model demonstrates how different forms of alienation may intersect.

The concept of belonging acquires particular importance. If, for Heidegger, a person is always already situated within some world, political philosophy in the work of Benhabib makes it possible to ask who has the possibility of being recognized as a participant in a common political world. In this respect, political belonging becomes not merely a legal but also a normative relationship (Benhabib, 2004).

The problem of belonging is connected with recognition. A person must not only physically reside within society but also have the possibility of perceiving themselves as a participant in shared life. The absence of such recognition may intensify a sense of distance and social invisibility (Honneth, 1995, 2001).

At the same time, political agency provides the possibility of movement in the opposite direction. Public action enables an individual or group to assert their presence and transform the relationships through which their belonging is determined.

Democratic iterations, in this sense, create a space for transforming exclusion into participation (Benhabib, 2006, 2007).

The relationship between recognition and participation should nevertheless not be understood as purely symbolic. Institutional arrangements also influence whether individuals and groups can participate as peers within social and political life (Fraser, 2000; Young, 1990).

Thus, overcoming alienation cannot be reduced to the internal restoration of meaning or to the simple provision of legal rights. The existential, social, and political levels must be considered simultaneously.

Existential orientation enables a person to relate themselves to their possibilities and their own existence (Heidegger, 1962). Social recognition creates conditions for the formation of a stable relationship with oneself and others (Honneth, 1995). Political belonging provides a space in which a person can act together with others (Benhabib, 2004, 2006).

On this basis, political agency can be understood as one form of overcoming alienation. It does not automatically eliminate the crisis of meaning, but it creates the possibility of an active relationship with the social world. The individual ceases to be exclusively an object of circumstances and becomes a participant in their transformation.

The comparison of Heidegger and Benhabib demonstrates that the contemporary problem of alienation requires abandoning a one-sided explanation. Existential analysis is necessary for understanding how a person experiences distance in relation to their own existence. Political philosophy is necessary for analyzing the conditions under which a person is or is not recognized as a participant in the common world.

The main theoretical difference between the two approaches lies in their level of analysis. Heidegger investigates the fundamental structures of human existence, whereas Benhabib focuses on the normative and institutional conditions of political belonging. Therefore, their comparison should not be transformed into the claim that political exclusion directly produces existential alienation or vice versa.

Nevertheless, an important space of intersection exists between these levels. A person realizes their existence within a social world, while political institutions determine a significant part of the conditions of their belonging to that world.

If social and political recognition are systematically restricted, a person may experience not only institutional discrimination but also a deeper distance from the common world. The problem of recognition and invisibility is relevant here because social presence does not necessarily amount to social recognition (Honneth, 2001).

The problem of migration becomes particularly significant in this regard. Contemporary migration processes demonstrate that the physical borders of states do not fully coincide with the boundaries of social life. People may live, work, and build relationships within a society without possessing full political membership. This makes the problem of belonging central to contemporary political philosophy (Benhabib, 2004, 2007).

The relationship between citizenship and membership also demonstrates that formal legal status does not exhaust the social meaning of belonging. Citizenship has historically been understood through legal, political, and social dimensions that do not always develop simultaneously (Marshall, 1950).

At the same time, the problem of people who lack secure political membership demonstrates the significance of Arendt's analysis of statelessness and the "right to have rights" (Arendt, 1951). This perspective complements Benhabib's analysis by emphasizing the political conditions through which rights become effective within an organized community.

At the same time, overcoming exclusion is possible through democratic action. Benhabib demonstrates that universal norms may be interpreted and reconsidered through democratic practices (Benhabib, 2006, 2007). Consequently, political agency represents not only the result of inclusion but also a mechanism for transforming the conditions of inclusion.

Fraser's approach further indicates that recognition cannot be separated entirely from institutional structures. The problem is not only whether an identity is positively represented, but whether individuals can participate in social life on a basis of parity (Fraser, 2000).

In this sense, social alienation should be understood not as a final state but as a process that may intensify or diminish depending on relations of recognition, belonging, and participation. Such a perspective makes it possible to preserve simultaneously the existential depth of the problem and its political-normative content.

CONCLUSION

The article examined the relationship between social alienation and the crisis of meaning through a comparison of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the political philosophy of Seyla Benhabib. The analysis demonstrated that alienation is a multi-level phenomenon that cannot be fully reduced either to an individual crisis or to political exclusion.

Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world makes it possible to understand the existential foundation of the problem. A person always exists within a particular world of meanings and possibilities; therefore, a crisis of meaningful orientation may be accompanied by a transformation in their relationship to their own existence (Heidegger, 1962). The question of meaningful orientation is also connected with the way individuals understand themselves within broader moral frameworks (Taylor, 1989). However, this crisis is not automatically political.

Benhabib, in turn, demonstrates that political belonging is connected with the question of who is recognized as a participant in the common political world (Benhabib, 2004). The concept of democratic iterations makes it possible to identify the possibility of reconsidering existing conditions of belonging through public action (Benhabib, 2006, 2007).

Social recognition connects these two levels. Its absence may contribute to social invisibility and a weakening of the sense of belonging (Honneth, 1995, 2001). Recognition is also related to the institutional conditions that allow individuals and groups to participate as peers in social life (Fraser, 2000). In the most radical cases, the loss of social ties may be described through the category of social death (Patterson, 1982), although applying this category to contemporary political situations requires caution and consideration of historical differences.

The problem of political belonging also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing formal citizenship from broader forms of social and political membership (Marshall, 1950). In situations of statelessness or severe political exclusion, Arendt's analysis further demonstrates the importance of belonging to an organized political community for the effective exercise of rights (Arendt, 1951).

The main conclusion of the study is that the crisis of meaning, social alienation, and political exclusion are not identical phenomena, but they may constitute an interconnected complex. Overcoming alienation therefore requires not only the individual restoration of meaningful orientation but also the development of relations of recognition and the expansion of opportunities for political participation.

Political agency in this context represents the possibility of moving from passive presence to active participation in the formation of the common world. It does not constitute a final state of complete belonging but rather a continuously renewed practice of recognition, action, and democratic reconsideration of the boundaries of the political community (Benhabib, 2007).

Therefore, the existential, social, and political dimensions of alienation should be considered together without collapsing their conceptual differences. The comparison of Heidegger and Benhabib demonstrates that the crisis of meaning may be understood more fully when the individual's relationship to the world is considered alongside the social and political conditions through which belonging, recognition, and agency become possible.

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XÜLASƏ

MÜASİR SİYASİ FƏLSƏFƏDƏ SOSIAL ÖZGƏLƏŞMƏ VƏ MƏNA BÖHRANI: HAYDEQGER VƏ BENHABİBİN İNTERPRETASIYASI

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Məqalədə Martin Haydegger və Seyla Benhabibin fəlsəfi yanaşmalarının müqayisəli təhlili vasitəsilə müasir siyasi fəlsəfədə sosial yadlaşma ilə məna böhranı arasındakı əlaqə araşdırılır. Tədqiqat yadlaşmanın yalnız fərdin təcrid olunması və ya şəxsiyyətlərarası münasibətlərin zəifləməsi vəziyyəti kimi başa düşülməməsi fikrinə əsaslanır. Əksinə, yadlaşma mənsubiyyətin, tanınmanın və siyasi iştirak imkanlarının itirilməsi təcrübələrində kəşifə bilən ekzistensial, sosial və siyasi ölçülərə malikdir. Tədqiqatın məqsədi ekzistensial yadlaşma, mənalı istiqamətlənmə böhranı, sosial tanınma və siyasi mənsubiyyət arasındakı nəzəri əlaqəni müəyyən etməkdir. Metodoloji baxımdan məqalədə müqayisəli-konseptual təhlildən istifadə edilir. Haydeggerin Dasein, dünyada-varlıq, gündəliklik və autentiklik təhlili yadlaşmanın ekzistensial ölçüsünü yenidən qurmaq üçün istifadə olunur, Benhabibin siyasi fəlsəfəsi isə tanınmanın, başqalarının hüquqlarının, siyasi mənsubiyyətin və mənsubiyyət sərhədlərinin demokratik şəkildə yenidən nəzərdən keçirilməsinin araşdırılması üçün çərçivə təmin edir. Təhlil göstərir ki, məna böhranı siyasi təcrid ilə eyni deyil; lakin sosial tanınmanın olmaması ilə birləşdikdə, sosial görünməzlik və siyasi icmaddan uzaqlaşma təcrübələrini gücləndirə bilər. Məqalədə irəli sürülür ki, yadlaşmanın aradan qaldırılması yalnız mənalı istiqamətlənmənin bərpasını deyil, həm də tanınma və siyasi subyektivliyin formalaşması üçün şəraitin yaradılmasını tələb edir.

Açar sözlər: sosial yadlaşma, məna böhranı, Martin Haydegger, Seyla Benhabib, tanınma, siyasi mənsubiyyət, sosial görünməzlik, siyasi subyektivlik

РЕЗИЮМЕ

СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ ОТЧУЖДЕНИЕ И КРИЗИС СМЫСЛА В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ: ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЯ ХАЙДЕГГЕРА И БЕНХАБИБ

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Статья посвящена исследованию взаимосвязи между социальной отчужденностью и кризисом смысла в современной политической философии посредством сравнительного анализа философских подходов Мартина Хайдеггера и Сейлы Бенхабиб. Исследование основывается на предпосылке, согласно которой отчуждение не следует понимать исключительно как индивидуальное состояние изоляции или как ослабление межличностных

отношений. Напротив, оно имеет экзистенциальные, социальные и политические измерения, которые могут пересекаться в опыте утраты принадлежности, признания и способности к политическому участию. Цель исследования заключается в выявлении теоретической взаимосвязи между экзистенциальным отчуждением, кризисом смысловой ориентации, социальным признанием и политической принадлежностью. В методологическом отношении в статье используется сравнительно-концептуальный анализ. Анализ Хайдеггера, посвященный Dasein, бытию-в-мире, повседневности и аутентичности, используется для реконструкции экзистенциального измерения отчуждения, тогда как политическая философия Бенхабиб предоставляет основу для рассмотрения признания, прав других, политической принадлежности и демократического пересмотра границ принадлежности. Анализ показывает, что кризис смысла не является идентичным политическому исключению; однако в сочетании с отсутствием социального признания он может усиливать переживания социальной невидимости и дистанцирования от политического сообщества. В статье утверждается, что преодоление отчуждения требует не только восстановления смысловой ориентации, но и создания условий для признания и политической субъектности.

Ключевые слова: *социальная отчужденность, кризис смысла, Мартин Хайдеггер, Сейла Бенхабиб, признание, политическая принадлежность, социальная невидимость, политическая субъектность*